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ABSTRACT
We show that in labor market models with adverse selection, otherwise observationally 
equivalent workers will experience less wage growth following a period in which they change 
jobs than following a period in which they do not. We find little or no evidence to support this 
prediction. In most specifications the coefficient has the opposite sign, sometimes statistically 
significantly so. When consistent with the prediction, the estimated effects are small and 
statistically insignificant. We consistently reject large effects in the predicted direction. We argue 
informally that our results are also problematic for a broader class of models of competitive labor 
markets.
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An individuals career usually spans several, or even many, rms. An exten-
sive literature in labor economics studies the possible mechanisms explaining
this job-to-job mobility. One key class of explanations includes the role of
adverse selection. These explanations posit that if an individuals employer
observes his ability more accurately than the rest of the market, then moving
provides a negative signal about ability. As has been established, if adverse
selection explains who leaves their job, this may a¤ect overall labor market
mobility and whether workers are matched to the jobs where they will be most
productive. Alternatively, workers may leave their jobs when they identify, or
are identied by, another rm in which they will be more productive. This
may occur through employee learning over time, or if outside rms observe
signals of quality that incumbent rms do not. Given these explanations have
di¤erent implications for the e¢ ciency of worker-rm matches, it is important
to understand the dominant driver of mobility.
We present a test for whether adverse selection is an important force in
the labor market. As alluded to above, in labor market models with adverse
selection, mobile workers have worse unobservables on average than observa-
tionally equivalent workers who remain with their current employer. Therefore,
mobility provides the market with negative information about a worker while
stability is a positive signal. This implies our prediction that following a move,
the wages of movers should rise less rapidly than those of similar workers who
remain with their employer. We emphasize this is not a prediction about wage
changes at the time the worker moves or remains with the employer. Indeed,
movers will generally require a compensating di¤erential for the adverse signal
that accompanies a move, as well as the lower subsequent wage growth.
Our prediction is also not about wage growth on a particular job. Thus,
both workers who stay and leave will make subsequent mobility decisions. The
cumulative e¤ects of these subsequent decisions lead to higher wage growth
for those who initially stayed than for those who initially left.
In a sense our prediction is tautological. By denition, adverse selection1
1We distinguish between adverse selection models and asymmetric information models
in which raiders sometimes have private information not available to incumbents. Lazear
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in the market for currently or recently employed workers means that moving
signals low quality. We recognize it may be possible to construct models in
which revealing oneself to be low ability leads to subsequent wage growth.
However, such models appear to us to be post hoc. Since there is a large,
and possibly innite, set of potential models of adverse selection in the labor
market, we cannot prove that all variants must have the property we test.
Instead we argue somewhat informally that the class of models to which it
applies is broad and describe three particular formulations for which our claim
can be established formally.
As described in the opening paragraph, not all models share this predic-
tion, and it is against these that our test will have power. If outside rms
have information that incumbent rms lack, mobility could be a positive sig-
nal. Or workers could move to rms with which they are better matched and,
once matched, invest in skills that are particularly useful at their new rm.
These models would suggest faster subsequent wage growth for movers than
for workers who do not move, which is the opposite of our prediction. Thus,
if we nd movers have slower subsequent wage growth than workers who do
not move, this suggests the dominant mechanism explaining mobility is ad-
verse selection, rather than these alternative models. Lack of support for our
prediction would suggest these alternative models may be the more important
drivers of mobility.
We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979, to test the pre-
diction regarding future wage growth. We nd little or no evidence to support
this prediction. In most cases, we nd very small di¤erences between movers
and stayers in subsequent wage growth, and point estimates tend to show
slightly larger future gains for movers. Using both matching models and sim-
ple models with regression controls, we consistently nd that in the four years
following a move/stay decision, wage growth is higher for those who originally
(1986) shows that with asymmetric information of this type, workers who leave their jobs
may be positively selected. This class of models includes Golan (2005) and Pinkston (2009).
There is also a literature on adverse selection that focuses on how rmswage policies a¤ect
the unobserved quality of their workers (Pallais 2014, Weiss 1980), which we also do not
address.
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moved than for those who stayed although the magnitude is small (1 to 2
percent) and not always statistically signicant.2 Our results using a ten-year
horizon are similar. Only when we limit ourselves to a one-year horizon do we
nd any evidence in support of the adverse selection hypothesis, and again,
any measured e¤ects are small. Thus our results provide little or no support
for the importance of adverse selection in the market for currently and recently
employed workers, at least in the case where raiding rms bid competitively.
It is important to recognize both the strengths and limitations of our re-
sults. First, adverse selection may be operating in the market, without being
the dominant driver of mobility. In these cases, movers may have faster sub-
sequent wage growth than workers who do not move, but these e¤ects are
partially o¤set by adverse selection. Our strategy does not allow us to identify
these attenuating e¤ects of adverse selection. However, if subsequent wage
growth is higher for movers than for stayers, this suggests adverse selection is
not the dominant force behind mobility. For example, skill might have a gen-
eral and a match-specic component. Firms might recruit workers for whom
they receive a positive signal about match quality even while knowing that,
on average, they will attract workers with lower than average general quality,
given observables.3 Alternatively, workers who have acquired a set of skills
at one job may move to another job at which they can use those skills more
productively and acquire new ones. There might still be an element of adverse
selection in who moves, but it might be fully obscured by the more important
career ladderconsideration.
Second, consistent with the entire literature on adverse selection in the la-
bor market, we assume that raiding rms act competitively. Adverse selection
2Note that this does not include the instantaneous e¤ect of the move/stay decision but
does include the e¤ects of any subsequent mobility.
3Consider a modied Burdett matching model in which productivity is the sum of a
general component observed only by the incumbent rm and a match-specic component
that can be observed immediately by a single potential raider. The raider would know that,
on average, it would successfully hire workers with low general productivity, but would be
willing to o¤er a higher wage to workers with whom they know they are well matched. As
the variance of the common component of productivity goes to 0, we recover the Burdett
model in which, provided workers receive a constant share of their VMP, future wage growth
is independent of recent mobility conditional on current wage.
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models without this assumption may not yield our prediction, as suggested by
our example above with match-specic productivity (which made the raiding
market uncompetitive). As a result, if we fail to nd support for the prediction,
we cannot completely rule out the existence of adverse selection. However, as
our match-specic productivity example also suggests, at least in some cases
we can rule out that adverse selection is the dominant mechanism explaining
mobility.
Our ndings stand in marked contrast with much, but not all, of the exist-
ing empirical literature. The seminal paper, Gibbons and Katz (1991), argues
that workers displaced in layo¤s are likely to be more adversely selected than
those displaced in plant closings. Consistent with this prediction, they nd
that the former su¤er larger wage losses. However, we note that regardless
of whether outside rms can observe a workers productivity, their prediction
follows more generally if wages are compressed within the rm (e.g. Frank,
1984), and rms are free to layo¤ workers in any order they prefer. Indeed
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) explicitly use a model in which adverse selection
is the source of wage compression within the rm and nd results consistent
with wage compression.
In contrast, Schoenberg (2007) follows much of the learning literature by
assuming the researcher directly observes a measure of ability not seen by the
market, in this case the score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test adminis-
tered as part of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Adverse se-
lection models imply that turnover should be negatively related to unobserved
ability. Further, in some cases, adverse selection implies wages of incumbent
workers should be more responsive than those of new workers to the AFQT.
She nds little support for either prediction, with the possible exception of
college graduates.
Our approach is in some ways closest to Kahn (2013) although we reach
quite di¤erent conclusions. She looks at wage variation among movers and
among stayers. Intuitively, if raiding rms have no information, then all raid-
ing rms should make the same o¤ers. So greater asymmetry leads to more
compressed o¤ers. More generally, increasing the variance of productivity
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should raise the variance of wages among movers less than among stayers.4
She uses business-cycle induced variation in the variance of productivity to
test this latter prediction and a measure of contact with outside rms to test
the former and nds strong evidence of asymmetric learning. An important
di¤erence between our approaches is that due to its complexity, her model, like
most in this literature, is limited to two periods and therefore cannot address
post-mobility wage changes.
Next, we review the theoretical literature on adverse selection models of
turnover, showing they share certain characteristics giving rise to our pre-
diction, despite important variation in the precise modeling decisions. Our
main challenge is that, with the exception of Greenwalds (1986) three-period
model, all existing models are limited to two periods and therefore cannot for-
mally generate our prediction. We therefore show that it holds in Greenwald,
a steady-state model in a companion paper (Cavounidis and Lang, 2015) and
a multi-period model, the details of which we relegate to an appendix. The
remainder of the paper follows the usual data/methods/results/conclusion for-
mat.
1 Theory
Almost all existing models of adverse selection in the labor market are limited
to two periods. The di¢ culty is that, in general, wage o¤ers should depend on
the workers entire mobility history and, possibly, whether he stays in the cur-
rent period. Thus, in period t, there are potentially 2t 2 histories of whether
the worker changed or remained with their employer, and 2t 1 wages (or distri-
butions in the case of Li, 2013) and more if layo¤s are permitted. Needless to
say, the problem rapidly becomes unwieldy as the number of periods increases.
In this section, we argue somewhat informally that our prediction arises from
a general class of models, including several well-known two-period models of
4Although the intuition behind this result is strong, it does not clearly apply to all
models of adverse selection. We do not, for example, believe that it applies to the model of
Li (2013), described in greater detail below.
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adverse selection. We then show formally that our prediction arises from three
variants of multi-period adverse selection models.
1.1 The generalargument
There is a broad class of labor turnover and adverse selection models in which
competition for workers makes the expected protability of new hires zero, but
rms earn quasi-rents on incumbent workers. We argue, somewhat informally,
that under a set of plausible auxiliary assumptions, all such models should have
a similar and simple prediction: of two otherwise observationally equivalent
workers earning the same wage, a worker who recently started a new job should
experience lower subsequent wage growth.
The intuition is relatively straightforward. In adverse selection models,
the current employer or incumbent is able to pay the worker less than his
value of marginal product (VMP). The employer thus earns quasi-rents on its
private information about worker quality. Outside raidersare in competi-
tion. They bid up wages to the expected value of marginal product of a new
hire plus a premium, reecting the expected surplus on workers subsequently
remaining with the rm. Therefore, if two workers are otherwise observation-
ally equivalent and earn the same wage, the one who has just changed jobs
will, on average, be less productive than the one who has not changed jobs
recently. Moreover, in the presence of adverse selection, the market infers that
the worker who has changed jobs is less productive than it had thought while
the worker who remained in her job is more productive. Therefore, if work-
ers are eventually paid their VMP, the worker who has recently changed jobs
should subsequently experience slower wage growth than the one who has not.
1.1.1 Regularities in two-period adverse selection models
In this section, we review several prominent adverse selection models of the
labor market. We show they all share two regularities. First, workers who
move are paid their expected VMP, and so raiders make zero expected prots.
Second, workers who do not move earn no more than their VMP and some
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earn less. Almost all adverse selection models of turnover rely on a simple two-
period model in which incumbent rms learn the productivity of their workers
at the end of the rst period. Most commonly, raiders have no information.
In the equilibrium of Greenwalds two-period model incumbents match the
outside o¤er for workers they wish to retain and do not countero¤er to other
workers. Workers who do not receive a countero¤er quit as do some other
workers who quit randomly. In equilibrium, the wage in the second-hand
market equals the average productivity of workers in that market. The wage
of workers who stay with their employer is less than or equal to their VMP.
The base model in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) has a similar structure. In
an extension of the model, incumbents o¤er higher wages to more able workers
in order to reduce the probability of a random quit. In this case, leavers earn
less than stayers, but outside rms still make zero-expected prot. Incumbents
make positive prot on (almost) all the workers they retain.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) use a structure similar to that in Greenwald with
two signicant departures. First, incumbents may lay o¤ workers. If they do,
the market observes that the workers have been laid o¤ and pays them their
average product. Raiders make o¤ers to workers who have not been laid o¤.
The incumbent rm decides whether to match. If it does not, the worker leaves.
If it does match, some workers depart randomly anyway. The equilibrium is
identical to Greenwald once we restrict the distribution of ability to those not
laid o¤. So regardless of whether they quit or are laid o¤, workers who move
are paid their expected productivity. Those who remain with the incumbent
rm are paid less than their productivity.
Several models assume raiding rms observe some signal of the workers
productivity. Schoenberg (2007) allows raiders some information about worker
productivity in the form of observable education and an imperfect signal of
ability. She also assumes that incumbents can match raiderso¤ers but also
allows incumbents to pay a premium above the outside o¤er in order to reduce
the risk of a random quit. Kahn (2013) assumes the incumbent observes the
raiderssignal of the workers productivity and chooses a wage to maximize
expected prot, taking into account the raiders equilibrium wage o¤er given
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the signal, and the e¤ect of the wage o¤er on the risk of a random quit. Despite
these di¤erences, as in all the two-period models discussed thus far, raiders
make zero expected prot, and incumbents pay the workers they retain less
than their marginal product.
The papers discussed so far generate an equilibriumwith endogenous turnover
either by assuming some exogenous turnover directly or a taste shock that
causes some workers to quit even if they receive a premium at their current
rm. In contrast, in Li (2013) raiders and incumbents make simultaneous of-
fers, and workers accept the highest o¤er they receive. In equilibrium, raiders
randomize their o¤ers and make zero expected prot. Incumbentso¤ers are
increasing in worker productivity but below the productivity of all workers
except the least able.
With the exception of Schoenberg (2007) and Kahn (2013), these models
assume that raiders can, at most, observe a workers employment history,
specically whether he has quit or been laid o¤. There is an important set
of adverse selection models beginning with Waldman (1984) in which raiders
can observe a workers task assignment.5 These models focus on how adverse
selection a¤ects task assignment and so they allow the equilibrium to unravel
to one without job-to-job mobility (although there may be layo¤s if the worst
workers are su¢ ciently unproductive). Without rm-specic capital, these
models would also unravel to one in which all workers are assigned to the
lowest-skill task. With rm-specic capital, workers are underpaid at the
incumbent rm but raiderso¤ers equal workersexpected productivity in the
tasks to which they would be assigned if they accepted the raiderso¤er.
In sum, in the two-period models, we have two regularities:
R1. Workers who change jobs are paid their expected VMP.
R2. Workers who remain with the incumbent rm earn no more than their
VMP and some earn strictly less.
R1 is not surprising. It must hold in every model in which there is su¢ cient
competition among potential raiders. If wages exceeded expected VMP, raiders
5See also Bernhardt (1995) and Waldman (1990).
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would incur losses and would not want to make o¤ers. If wages were less than
expected VMP, competing raiders would bid them up.
R2 is also not surprising. Without some commitment mechanism, rms
will prefer to re workers rather than pay them more than their VMP. A
number of papers (e.g. Harris and Holmstrom 1982; Lazear 1979) do, however,
assume a commitment mechanism exists. If there is a wedge between a workers
productivity at the incumbent and her expected VMP elsewhere, possibly
created by private information, match-specic productivity or rm-specic
capital, we generally expect the rm to reap some of the (quasi-) rents.
1.1.2 Generalmultiperiod adverse selection models: features
In this section we argue that multiperiod models will in general share the
regularities of two-period models, regardless of the models details:
1. Zero expected prot at time of hire: Clearly we would not expect rms
to raid if doing so would be unprotable. If poaching led to positive
prots, in a market-clearing model, rms would increase their wage o¤ers
to out-compete other raiders. The expected discounted present value of
future VMP and wages at the hiring rm should be equal
1X
t=0
 
tVMPt
t
j=0pj

=
1X
t=0
 
twt
t
j=0pj

(1)
where  is the discount factor, pj is the probability that the worker
remains with the rm in period j given that he has remained with the
rm through period j   1 and p0 equals 1. VMP is the expected value
of marginal product given the worker is still with the rm.
2. Informational rents: Firms earn quasi-rents on their incumbent workers
over at least some period. This appears to us to be an essential feature
of adverse selection models.
1X
t=t0
 
tVMPt
t
j=t0pj

>
1X
t=t0
 
twt
t
j=t0pj

(2)
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for some t0 > 0: Note that pt0 is 1 when evaluated at t0.
Combining (1) and (2), leads to our rst important regularity.
Proposition 1 New workers are initially overpaid.
Proof. Rewrite (1) as
t0X
t=0
 
tVMPt
t
j=0pj

+ t
0
j=0pj
1X
t=t0
 
tVMPt
t
j=t0pj

=
t0X
t=0
 
twt
t
j=0pj

+ t
0
j=0pj
1X
t=t0
 
twt
t
j=t0pj

(3)
Rearranging terms
t0X
t=0
 
tVMPt
t
j=0pj
  t0X
t=0
 
twt
t
j=0pj

= t
0
j=0pj
 1X
t=t0
 
twt
t
j=t0pj
  1X
t=t0
 
tVMPt
t
j=t0pj
!
(4)
< 0
where the last inequality follows from (2).
Note that this result fails in the special case of the second period of a two-
period model since there is no t0 > 2: For the same reason, it will fail in the
last period of any model in which the number of employment periods is nite.
It holds in the rst period of two-period models but is largely ignored because
it leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of other o¤setting factors, wages
fall from the rst to the second period. Of course, the decline can be avoided
by assuming that VMP increases su¢ ciently quickly between periods.
Our third assumption/regularity is somewhat more speculative. We rst
state the assumption and then argue its plausibility.
3. The market eventually learns the workers type: The raiding markets
belief about each workers productivity has a martingale point estimate.
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The argument is essentially identical to Farber and Gibbons (1996).
Moreover, provided productivity is bounded, the martingale is bounded.
Therefore we know from Doobs Martingale Convergence Theorem that
the markets point estimate of each workers productivity converges al-
most surely.
In other words, the posterior beliefs about v, the VMP, satisfy:
lim
t!1
E[vj
t]! v^1 a:s:
We now argue that beliefs must converge to a point. Suppose the market
beliefs for a worker with a given history are nondegenerate but their expecta-
tion has converged. Then either there is no additional mobility, every worker
quits or the average productivity of quitters equals the average productivity of
workers with that history. We rule out the rst two possibilities by at. They
would not happen in any existing model. In the last case, raiding rms would
o¤er workers the expected productivity for workers with their history.6 Since
the workers who leave are, on average, average, the incumbent would make no
informational rents and would only be willing to pay workers up to their value
of marginal product. But if that were the case, all workers with productiv-
ity below the average would quit, and since not all workers quit, on average,
quitting workers would not have the expected productivity for workers with
their history, a contradiction. Therefore, the raiding markets beliefs should
converge to a degenerate distribution. As the truth must be in the support of
the limiting distribution if it was in the priors, beliefs must converge on the
truth.
Of course, in reality, lifetimes are not innite. We require the market to
learn the workers type before his retirement.7 This is plausible if a) there is
6Note that under the assumption, they would not earn informational rents after hiring a
worker.
7The technical problem that arises is that, in those adverse selection models in which
workers move randomly, we can never know whether a worker who followed a particular
mobility path is a worker of the type that should follow that path or one who has moved
randomly in one or more periods. Of course, with enough data, this should cease to be a
problem, but in nite time it will never be eliminated.
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an element of symmetric learning that accompanies the asymmetric learning
and b) the time to retirement is long.
The importance of this third regularity for our purposes is that if the market
knows a workers productivity then his wage will equal his productivity. This
yields our result that of two observationally equivalent workers who are earning
the same wage, wage growth should be lower for the worker who just changed
jobs. We showed that the worker who changed jobs is less productive. Since
their wages are equal in period t, and wages eventually equal productivity,
wage growth must be lower for the worker who moved.
More generally, our results will go through if the wages of older workers
are close to their VMP. We note that there are a variety of ways of obtaining
a similar result. For example, if rms cannot commit not to re overpaid
workers, then over the long run wage can never exceed VMP. But workers
will quit when their value of leisure exceeds their wage. Therefore incumbent
rms should pay the worker at least his value of leisure. But, under suitable
regularity conditions, as the value of leisure approaches VMP, this means that
the wage also approaches VMP. A di¤erent version of our principal result goes
through if retirement age is not (too) sensitive to wages.
1.1.3 Generalmultiperiod adverse selection models: implications
Assumptions:
A1. E (VMPitjmovert)  wit
A2. E (VMPitjstayert)  wit
A3. At least one of the two inequalities above is strict
A4. 9tj8t 2 [t; T ] wt = VMPt where T represents retirement age.
A5. E (VMPit0   VMPitjmover) = E (VMPit0   VMPitjstayer) , 8t0 > t.
The rst four assumptions were addressed in the previous section. The
last assumption says that job assignment does not a¤ect future productivity
12
growth. This assumption would be violated if, for example, mobility is driven
by career factors so that, as they acquired skills, workers moved up a job ladder
and invested in new skills more heavily after moving. We note that adverse
selection models typically assume no productivity growth.
We now turn to our main result.
Proposition 2 Suppose wmt = wst, where m denotes the mover and s the
stayer. Under assumptions (A1)-(A5)
E (wmt)  wmt < E (wst)  wst (5)
Proof. From A1 and A2
E (VMPmt)  wmt = wst  E (VMPst) (6)
with at least one strict inequality (A3) so that
E (VMPmt) < E (VMPst) . (7)
We also have from A5
E (VMPmt)  E (VMPmt) = E (VMPmt   VMPmt) (8)
= E (VMPst   VMPst) (9)
= E (VMPst)  E (VMPst) : (10)
Now from A4
E (VMPmt)  E (VMPmt) = E (wmt)  E (VMPmt) (11)
 E (wmt)  wmt (12)
where the second inequality uses A1. Similarly, from A4 and A2
E (VMPst)  E (VMPst) = E (wst)  E (VMPst) (13)
 E (wst)  wst (14)
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Combining (8), (10), (12) and (14) gives (5).
The proposition is quite powerful. The prediction of higher future wage
growth depends only on equal current wages and equal expected productivity
growth. Therefore, in bringing the theory to the data, we need control only
for factors such as experience that we expect to predict future productivity
growth although in practice we will control for other observables.
1.2 Three multiperiod adverse selection models
As discussed, multiperiod adverse selection models become unwieldy. To ad-
dress this problem, we argue in the previous section that the regularities of
two-period adverse selection models are shared by multiperiod models. We
then show that a generalmultiperiod model with these regularities yields
our prediction. In this section, we present three specic multiperiod adverse
selection models that use di¤erent approaches to solve the problem of un-
tractability. While each is problematic, we hope that the models and intuitive
arguments will help convince readers of the generality of our argument.
We present the results of Greenwalds three-period model, which has the
property that there is no period with more than two histories and only four
di¤erent equilibrium wages. But, of course, it is only three periods. Our second
model allows for an arbitrarily large, possibly innite, number of periods but
allows for only two types of worker. This model assumes that as soon as two
rms have observed a workers type, they Bertrand compete for her services.
In this way, rms need only know the timing of a workers rst move. Finally,
in the third model, we present the results of Cavounidis and Lang (2015)
who restrict the markets memory to a single period so that wage o¤ers are
conditioned only on whether the worker moved last period. In contrast to the
general argument we made earlier, in this model convergence to the truth fails
because the market also forgets, and thus information is lost. Nevertheless,
our principal prediction holds.
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1.2.1 Greenwald (1986) three-period model
Greenwald develops a three-period model with a continuum of types. Workers
are hired competitively in period 1: At the end of the period, rms observe
the productivity of the workers they hired. Raiding rms make o¤ers. In-
cumbent rms may make countero¤ers. Most workers accept the o¤er that
maximizes their discounted earnings over the next two periods, but a fraction
quits randomly. All rms observe which workers have remained with the in-
cumbent employer and which workers have moved. At the end of the second
period, rms that have successfully raided other rms observe the productiv-
ity of those raided workers. The prior employer either forgets the workers
productivity or cannot make her an o¤er. All other rms make o¤ers. The
incumbent employer can make a countero¤er. Workers accept the higher o¤er
except for a fraction that quits randomly.
Greenwald proves the following. In the third period, the wage received by a
worker who remained with her original employer for two periods is independent
of whether she stays or quits in the third period. We denote this wage by ws3
where the s denotes staying with the rst-period employer in the second period.
Similarly, the wage received by a worker who changed jobs between periods 1
and 2 is independent of whether she remains with her new employer or quits
again in period 3: We denote this wage by wq3.
Greenwald further shows that
ws3  wq3 (15)
and that
wq2  ws2 (16)
where these refer to wages paid to quitters and stayers in the third and second
periods. The inequalities are strict in all but the case where workers are
completely myopic.
It follows that
ws3   ws2 > wq3   wq2. (17)
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Wages rise faster following a stay than following a quit. As Greenwald explains,
quitters must be compensated in the second period for the adverse signal that
quitting provides while stayers are rewarded in the third period for the positive
signal.
1.2.2 Bertrand competition between informed employers
We assume that there are two types of worker with productivities vh and vl;
where vh > vl. Workers are hired competitively at the beginning of the rst
period. At the end of this period, the incumbent rm learns the workers type.
Raiding rms make o¤ers. Incumbent rms make countero¤ers. If at any time
t, a worker has never left the original incumbent rm, raiders observe this fact
and use this information when making their o¤ers to which the incumbent
rm may countero¤er. If a worker leaves in any period, at the end of the next
period both the original incumbent and the successful raider know the workers
type. They Bertrand compete for her services and therefore o¤er her vi. Other
rms do not make o¤ers.8 Workers observe the outside o¤ers and countero¤er
and choose the one that maximizes the present value of their lifetime earnings.
We show in the appendix that the following is the unique equilibrium: Low-
productivity workers exit their initial rm in nite time. The path of raiding
o¤ers is given by
qt+1 = qt (1 + r)  rvl if qt (1 + r)  rvl < vh
qt = vh; otherwise: (18)
where qt denotes the wage received by quitters in period t and r is the discount
rate. In other words, raiding o¤ers rise steadily because high-productivity
workers become an increasing share of the pool of incumbent workers. This
continues until the raiding o¤er would exceed the productivity of the high-
productivity types, at which point only high-productivity types remain with
the incumbent and raiders o¤er vh.
In every period after the initial hire the incumbent rm o¤ers vl to its
8Or could always o¤er vl.
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low-productivity workers. It o¤ers high-productivity workers
st =
vh + vlr
1 + r
; if t < T
sT = qT (19)
st = vh; if t > T:
where T denotes the last period in which a low-productivity worker quits.
Thus, in T and all prior periods it o¤ers a constant wage s < vh to its high-
productivity workers. In period T; in which the last low-productivity worker
quits, we have st<T < sT < vh. Thereafter high-productivity workers are paid
vh.
The model conrms our general intuition. The assumption of Bertrand
competition means that successful raiders earn no subsequent rents. Conse-
quently, quitters are paid their expected productivity and in all subsequent
periods are paid their actual productivity. Consequently, their average wages
neither rise nor fall subsequent to moving. In most periods, workers who con-
tinue not to move also receive the same average wage, but this wage is below
the productivity of the high-productivity workers. But workers who stayed
and now quit are paid their average VMP which exceeds their average wage
with the incumbent. In addition, in two periods (in a knife-edge case, one
period), the wage paid by the incumbent to high-productivity workers also
rises.
1.2.3 Steady-state with limited memory
Cavounidis and Lang (2015) derive the steady-state equilibrium of a model
with two types of workers (high and low productivity). The market only ob-
serves whether the worker quit or remained with her previous rm last period.
The assumption of limited memory makes the model tractable. They assume
that a small fraction of workers quits exogenously and that the incumbent rm
and worker Nash bargain over the wage with the outside o¤er as the workers
threat point. There is symmetric information between the incumbent and the
worker because incumbent rms learn the workers productivity at the end of
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the rst period, before engaging in bargaining.
They show that low-productivity workers who remain with their rm earn
the lowest equilibrium wage but receive a compensating di¤erential when they
quit. Subsequent to quitting, these workers take a wage cut regardless of
whether they remain with their new rm or quit again. High-productivity
workers who stayed with their rm take a pay cut if they exogenously leave.
Subsequent to leaving they take a further pay cut if they quit again and may
or may not take a second pay cut if they remain with their new rm. This
depends on the precise parameters of the model. On the one hand, the negative
signal of having moved lowers their outside option. On the other, the rm now
knows that the worker is good and is therefore willing to bargain to a higher
wage. They show the net result is that, on average, wages rise following a
period in which the worker stays with the rm and fall following a period in
which they quit.
2 Data
We test the models main prediction using the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979, a nationally representative sample of 12,686 individuals who were
14-22 years old at the time they were rst surveyed in 1979, with oversamples
of blacks, Hispanics and poor whites. These individuals are surveyed annually
through 1994, and biennially afterwards. We exclude the sample of individuals
who were serving in the military at the time of the sample selection in 1978.
Testing the models prediction requires the following variables for an obser-
vation in period t : wage (in t; t  t0) , whether the respondent is at a new job
(in t  t0), total job mobility (through t  t0   1), and total weeks of potential
experience (in t   t0), for t0 = 1; 4; 10. The lags of these variables are created
using the value of the variable at the time of the previous interviews.
We dene potential experience as the number of weeks between the current
period and the individuals long-term transition to the labor market. Following
Farber and Gibbons (1996), we assume that an individual has made a long-
term transition to the labor market when he or she has spent three consecutive
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years primarily working, after at least a year spent not primarily working. An
individual is dened to be primarily working in a given year if he or she spends
more than 26 weeks working, and averages more than 30 hours per week over
the working weeks. After 1993, individuals were interviewed every two years,
instead of every year. Thus, it is not possible to identify long-term transitions
to the labor market using the already constructed variables indicating weeks
and hours worked since the last interview.
To identify long-term transitions to the labor market, we identify 52-week
periods starting in every week. For each individual, we calculate the weeks
and hours worked over these 52-week periods using the weekly arrays from
the NLSY. We assume that an individual has made a long-term transition to
the labor market when there are three consecutive 52-week periods in which
the individual is primarily working, following a 52-week period in which the
individual is not primarily working. The week in which the individual makes a
long-term transition to the labor market is denoted as the week since January
1, 1978.9 To obtain weeks of potential experience, we calculate the number of
weeks between the interview date and January 1, 1978, and then subtract the
week number at which the individual made a long-term transition to the labor
market.
We focus on the wage, hours worked, and transitions from the current
job.10 We are able to identify whether a worker changes jobs using the NLSY-
constructed variable tracking employers across interviews. A worker is coded
as being at a new job if the current employer is di¤erent from each of the ve
most recent employers listed at the last interview. A worker is coded as staying
at the current job if the current employer is the same as the current employer
9Due to the computational intensity of this procedure, it was performed over the high-
performance shared computing cluster operated by Boston University.
10In some survey years the CPS job is identied in addition to the ve most recent jobs.
However, the CPS job is always identical to the most recent/current job (job #1)).
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at the time of the last interview.11 Workers are coded as neither movers nor
stayers in the year they make their long-run transition to the labor market.
Controlling for total job mobility helps to ensure we compare observation-
ally identical workers up to the period before the move. For individuals in a
new job in t  t0 we control for the total number of jobs up until t  t0 1. The
NLSY contains a measure of the total number of jobs an individual had ever
reported at the time of each interview. A drawback of this measure is that it
includes very part-time jobs that are held at the same time as the principal
job. Mobility in the principal job is the relevant measure for our test.
An alternative measure of total job mobility is the number of times the
individual is at a new current job. This is equivalent to adding the number of
times newjob = 1 for each respondent. Because it only captures jobs at the
time of the interview, this measure will likely underestimate the amount of
mobility.12 This is particularly problematic when individuals are only inter-
viewed every two years. We estimate our specications using this alternative
measure for robustness (results with this alternative measure are shown in the
appendix).
Both methods for measuring total mobility rely on the number of times the
individual had been interviewed. We thus restrict the sample to individuals
who have been interviewed in every year through t.
The empirical strategy, discussed in detail below, controls for the values
of variables in t   t0 for t0 = 1; 4; 10. Through 1994, for t0 = 1 we dene the
lagged variable as the one-year lag because individuals are surveyed annually.
However, starting in 1996 individuals are interviewed every two years. We
dene the one-period lag in 1996 as the value from 1994, since this is the date
of the last interview. The two-period lag is 1993. Starting in 1998, we dene
11This construction excludes respondents whose current employer di¤ers from the current
employer identied last period, but is the same as the third most recent employer last period.
Despite a gap in employment, this employer presumably still has incumbent-like information
about the employee and so is not treated as a new rm. This individual is coded as neither
a mover nor a stayer, and so is dropped from the analysis.
12For example, an individual may have a di¤erent job at the time of the interview in May,
1980 than when interviewed in May, 1981. However, she may have had a di¤erent job from
January, 1981 to April, 1981 and this job would not be captured.
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the one-period lag as the value from two years ago, and the two-period lag as
the value from four years ago. For t0 = 4 and 10, we dene the value in t  t0
as the value from four or ten years ago, respectively, for all survey years.13
Controlling for year xed e¤ects mitigates concerns about di¤erent denitions
of lags in di¤erent years.
The years of the observations in our sample range from 1981 to 2010.
Because we dene long-run transitions to the labor market as following a year
of primarily not working, the earliest an individual could have entered the labor
market is 1979. In the 1979 interview, which is the rst interview, individuals
are asked for weekly employment data from 1978. As mentioned, we do not
identify whether the individual is at a new job until the individuals second
year in the labor market, and thus the earliest such year is 1980. Because
our specications rely on whether the individual was at a new job in the
last period, 1981 is the rst year we observe individuals in the data. While
we cannot identify whether the individual was at a new job in 1979, we can
identify her wages since she had made her long-run transition to the labor
market. This allows us to identify the second lag of wage in 1981.
We limit the sample in a way similar to Kahn (2013). We require that in
periods t and t  t0 the individual is not self employed or employed in a family
business, not enrolled in school, earns an hourly wage of at least one dollar
and less than or equal to 500 dollars (in 1999 dollars), works at least 35 hours
per week, and is currently working at the rst listed job and not at the second
through fth listed jobs.14 These restrictions result in a sample of 7,347 indi-
viduals with consecutive survey responses. There are 36,737 individual/year
observations in which the individual had not moved in the previous period,
and 14,118 individual/year observations in which the individual had moved to
a new job in the previous period.
Table 1 shows that, unsurprisingly, there are di¤erences between those who
13When t0 = 4, values in t  t0   1 are those from ve years ago for respondents through
1998, and six years ago for respondents starting in 2000.
14We require these conditions are also true in t   t0   1 in the specications controlling
for wage in t   t0   1 (described below). Wages are converted to 1999 dollars using the
CPI-Urban series.
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were in a new job last period and those who were not. Respondents in a new
job last period had fewer weeks of total experience, lower wages this period
and last period, more total jobs, and they were less likely to be white-collar
workers.15
While it is not the focus of our study, for comparability to other studies,
we estimate the contemporaneous e¤ect of moving on wages. Topel and Ward
(1992) nd the contemporaneous e¤ects of a job transition are largest when
occuring in the rst 2.5 years of experience. Similar to Topel and Ward (1992),
we regress ln(waget)  ln(waget 1) on newjobt. While Topel and Ward focus
their analysis on white males, we include both white and nonwhite males and
females, and include controls for male, Hispanic, and Black. We also control
for total mobility up through t, weeks experience, and age, and implement the
sample restrictions described above.
When limiting the sample to those with between 0 and 2.5 years of ex-
perience (0 and 130 weeks), the coe¢ cient on newjobt is .048, statistically
signicant at the .01 level. Limiting the sample to those with less than ve
years of experience, the coe¢ cient on newjobt is .02, and has a p-value of .032.
When using the alternative denition of mobility, rather than the total jobs
from NLSY, the coe¢ cients are no longer statistically signicant although the
magnitudes are still positive (although less so). Limiting the sample to those
with less than 7.5 years of experience and less than 10 years of experience, the
coe¢ cients on newjobt are not statistically signicant. These results suggest
consistency with the standard nding that at very early stages of the career,
there is a positive, contemporaneous e¤ect of moving.
15Similarly, we estimate the cross-section relation between current wage and a quartic in
total jobs up through period t, weeks experience, and demographics (not lagged wages).
We limit the sample in a similar way as the main regression studying one-period wage
growth. The coe¢ cients on total jobs are jointly signicant, and the magnitudes suggest
that greater mobility is associated with higher wages, up through approximately 15 jobs.
The mean number of jobs is 7.8.
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0 1
Hourly Waget 17.08 14.05***
[13.72] [11.23]
Hourly Waget-1 16.37 13.09***
[13.] [10.53]
Weeks Experiencet-1 614.92 486.71***
[375.6] [373.45]
Total Jobst-2 7.41 8.74***
[4.57] [5.69]
White Collart-2 0.59 0.49***
[.49] [.5]
Blue Collart-2 0.4 0.43***
[.49] [.49]
Age in 1979 17.69 17.41***
[2.29] [2.27]
Male 0.58 0.58
[.49] [.49]
Black 0.12 0.13***
[.33] [.34]
Hispanic 0.06 0.06
[.23] [.23]
Observations 36,737 14,118
New Jobt-1
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   Asterisks denote whether the difference in 
the average for movers and stayers is statistically significant.  See text for variable 
definition and construction.  The proportion of respondents who were white collar 
and blue collar does not add to one because some respondents have a value of zero 
for both white and blue collar (their occupation was defined as neither white nor blue 
collar, or it was not reported).
Table 1: Summary Statistics, by New Job Last Period
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3 Empirical Strategy
Our theory refers to the wages in period t of individuals who have the same
wage in period t   t0, but di¤er in whether they were at a new job in t   t0.
Therefore, in principle we could test the adverse selection hypothesis by simply
regressing future wages on a lagged wage and whether the worker moved in the
period for which we measure the lagged wage (e.g. regress the wage in period
t on the wage in period t  t0 and whether the worker had a new job in period
t   t0). We are, however, concerned that the hypothesis should not be tested
without consideration of other elements of the labor market, in particular that
we expect less experienced workers to acquire human capital more rapidly and
therefore to have faster wage growth. In addition, since the markets inference
about the worker should depend on her entire work history, we allow the wage
to depend on the number of prior moves. This will also allow us to control for
the possibility that some occupations are simply higher turnover than others.
Thus, we begin by comparing individuals who were, and were not, at a new
job in t  t0, and their wage growth from t  t0 to t. If wages or wage growth
is sticky, then rms may have to wait more than one year after the hire before
they are able to pay the mover less than the stayer. Further, models which
involve match-specic quality or rm-specic capital may involve larger wage
growth for the mover over time, but not in the rst year after the move. As a
result, we estimate the following regression for t0 = 1; 4; 10, which includes year
xed e¤ects, standard errors clustered at the individual level, and observations
weighted by the sampling weights of the survey (normalized so that the sum of
the weights across all years is equal to the total number of observations across
all years):16
16Results from unweighted regressions are very similar. We also estimate the specications
with only heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (without clustering standard errors at
the individual-level). Results are in general quite similar. While the unclustered standard
errors are larger in several specications (mostly in the specications looking at one- and
ten-year wage growth), they do not yield di¤erences in whether the coe¢ cient is statistically
signicant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% signicance levels.
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Ln(Wageit) = 0 + 1NewJobi;t t0 +
4X
q=1
(qWeeksExperience
q
i;t t0 (20)
+ q(Ln(Wagei;t t0))q + qTotalJobs
q
i;t t0 1) +X + t + it
Similarly, some types of workers may simply be on faster wage growth
paths than others. If this is correlated with worker mobility, our results may be
misleading. To better address this concern, we focus on specications in which
we also control for the wage in t  t0   1. We thus estimate the specication:
Ln(Wageit) = 0 + 1NewJobi;t t0 +
4X
q=1
(qWeeksExperience
q
i;t t0 (21)
+ 3(Ln(Wagei;t t0))
q + 4TotalJobs
q
i;t t0 1
+ 5(Ln(Wagei;t t0 1))
q) +X + t + it
We test whether the results are heterogeneous by sex, potential experience,
number of prior moves, and education level. An additional specication in-
cludes age as well as indicators for male, Hispanic, and Black as explanatory
variables in the main specication.
Following Gibbons and Katz (1991), we also test whether adverse selection
is more important for white-collar workers. These workers are less likely to be
bound by collective bargaining agreements, giving their rms more discretion
over worker mobility. We look at whether the worker was white collar in
t  t0   1, since this will a¤ect whether the worker was at a new job in t  t0:
Interestingly, we see in table 1 that white collar workers are less likely to be
at a new job. We dene white collar and blue collar based on Gibbons and
Katz (1991).17
17Agricultural and private household workers are coded as neither blue nor white collar.
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Finally, to determine whether adverse selection is more prominent among
higher (or lower) wage workers, we interact NewJobi;t t0 with Ln(Wagei;t t0).
Because movers and stayers are di¤erent, and because the linearity assump-
tions underlying the regression model may be problematic, we present results
from a nearest-neighbor matching procedure, implemented using the nnmatch
routine in STATA. Each respondent who was at a new job in t  t0 is matched
to one other respondent who was not at a new job in t  t0, based on the values
of WeeksExperiencei;t t0 , Ln(Wagei;t t0), TotalJobsi;t t0 1, and year.18 We
specify exact matching for survey year.
The closest match is determined based on the following distance metric:
D = (jXm   Xnj0S 1jXm   Xnj)1=2, where X is an N  K matrix of the
matching variables and S is the K K diagonal matrix of the inverse sample
standard errors of the K matching variables. If there were two equally good
matches then both were used. While each observation is matched to another,
not every observation is itself used as a match. The procedure corrects for
bias arising from di¤erences in the covariates within a matched pair, using the
adjustment suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2011). The procedure further
allows for heteroskedastic standard errors by conducting a second matching
process, among those in the same treatment group. This allows for a compar-
ison of outcomes for observations with approximately the same values of the
matching variables. This correction yields smaller standard errors, and so our
main results show the more conservative unadjusted standard errors.19
4 Results
The rst column of table 2 shows that if two workers made the same wage last
period but one was at a new job while the other was not, the one-period wage
One individual listed armed forces as an occupation, which is coded as neither blue nor
white collar. In addition, a number of respondents are coded as neither blue nor white
collar because of missing occupational data. Details in the appendix.
18For robustness, we also implement the procedure matching on Ln(Wagei;t t0 1).
19Because of the large number of individuals in the data set, this matching routine is
highly computationally intensive, and was run on a shared computing cluster.
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growth of the mover is not statistically signicantly di¤erent. The coe¢ cient is
a fairly precisely estimated 0. Column 2 shows this result does not change when
controlling for demographic characteristics. Columns 3 and 4 show that when
controlling for the second lag of wage, wages of the mover are approximately
1 log point larger than the wages of the worker who did not move, and we
can reject the hypothesis that this coe¢ cient, while small, equals 0. Columns
(5) through (7) also show no evidence of adverse selection when restricting
the sample to various subgroups, including males, blue-collar workers, and
workers with less than or equal to the 25th percentile of WeeksExperiencet 1
(269 weeks, or approximately 5 years). Column (8) shows no evidence of
adverse selection once allowing for heterogeneity based on the previous periods
wage. Results from the matching estimation are similar to the principal results
(column 9).20 In all cases we can reject an adverse e¤ect of more than one
percent.
There is also no evidence of adverse selection when estimating the regres-
sion separately for individuals (and also only for males) with less than a high
school diploma, a high school diploma, some college, and at least a bachelors
degree. While the e¤ects including the second lag of wage are not signicant
for any group except those with a high school diploma, the coe¢ cients are most
negative for individuals with at least a bachelors degree and males without a
high school diploma (Appendix Table A1).21
Finally, we interact NewJobi;t t0 with the quartic in total job mobility.
Appendix Table A4 shows these interaction terms are statistically signicant,
but the combined e¤ect of being in a new job last period is zero or positive up
through approximately 25 jobs (the mean number of jobs up through t  2 is
7.3).
20The results from the principal specication are very similar when we use the alternative
measure of job mobility, TotalMovest 2, and when we do not weight the observations by the
sampling weights of the survey (not shown). When we implement the matching procedure
also matching on the second lag of wage, the magnitude is slightly smaller than the regression
estimate and is not statistically signicant.
21These specications are estimated both including and not including the second lag of
wage, though restricting the sample to be the same in either specication.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Matching
NewJobt-1 -0.0003 -0.001 0.010** 0.010** 0.009 0.012* 0.015* 0.020 -0.0004
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.026] [.004]
NewJobt-1*Ln(Waget-1) -0.004
[0.010]
Observations 50,855 50,855 40,514 40,514 22,804 18,221 10,128 40,514 50,855
R-squared 0.742 0.743 0.771 0.772 0.766 0.697 0.648 0.772
Subgroup All All All All Male Blue Collart-2
Experiencet-1
≤25th 
percentile All All
Include Demographics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-2) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Relation between Job Mobility and One-Year Wage Growth
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  Observations 
weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. Each regression includes year fixed effects, and a quartic in 
weeksexperiencet-1, Ln(Wage)t-1,  and TotalJobst-2.  Regressions including the second lag of wage also include a quartic in 
Ln(Wage)t-2.  Column (7) restricts the sample to individuals with weeks experience ≤  the 25th percentile of the distribution 
(269 weeks, or approximately 5 years). In the final column, observations who were in a new job last period are matched to 
observations not in a new job last period, based on weeks experiencet-1, waget-1, total jobst-2, and survey year. Exact 
matching was specified for survey year. The procedure uses the bias adjustment in Abadie and Imbens (2011). See text for 
details of sample construction, regression specifications, and matching procedure.
4.1 Longer-term Wage Growth
Table 3 also shows no evidence of adverse selection based on four-year wage
growth. Column 1 shows that wages of workers who moved four years ago
are approximately 1.2% higher than wages of workers who did not change
jobs four years ago, a di¤erence of about 0.3% per year. The e¤ect does
not change dramatically when controlling for demographics. Columns 3 and
4 show that when controlling for the fth lag of wage, the e¤ect increases
slightly in magnitude. The e¤ect appears smaller for males, larger for blue-
collar workers, and similar for less-experienced workers, but all di¤erences are
small and statistically insignicant. Again, there is no evidence of adverse
selection when allowing for heterogeneity by wage in t   t0. Results from the
matching estimation are similar to the principal results (column 9).22 Overall,
the estimated e¤ects, while precisely estimated, are negligible over a four-year
period.
The interactions between NewJobi;t 4 and TotalJobsi;t 5 are jointly sta-
22When we match on the 5th lag of wage as well, the e¤ect is larger (magnitude of .023)
and more statistically signicant than the regression estimate.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Matching
NewJobt-4 0.012** 0.010* 0.016** 0.015** 0.011 0.020** 0.015 0.047 0.011*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.034] [.006]
NewJobt-4*Ln(Waget-4) -0.013
[0.014]
Observations 35,958 35,958 28,376 28,376 16,374 12,960 7,095 28,376 35,958
R-squared 0.652 0.655 0.691 0.693 0.683 0.587 0.505 0.693
Subgroup All All All All Male Blue Collart-5
Experiencet-4
≤25th 
percentile All All
Include Demographics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-5) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  Observations 
weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. Each regression includes year fixed effects, and a quartic in weeksexperiencet-
4, Ln(Wage)t-4,  and TotalJobst-5.  Regressions including the fifth lag of wage also include a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-5.  Column (7) 
restricts the sample to individuals with weeks experience ≤  the 25th percentile of the distribution (258 weeks, or 
approximately 5 years). In the final column, observations who were in a new job last period are matched to observations not in 
a new job last period, based on weeks experiencet-4, waget-4, total jobst-5, and survey year. Exact matching was specified for 
survey year. The procedure uses the bias adjustment in Abadie and Imbens (2011). See text for details of sample construction, 
regression specifications, and matching procedure.
Table 3: Relation between Job Mobility and Four-Year Wage Growth
tistically signicant with p = :06 (Appendix Table A4). The combined e¤ect
of being at a new job is positive up through about 10 jobs (the mean number
of jobs up through t 5 is approximately 7.2). There is no evidence of adverse
selection when estimating a separate regression for each education group, or
among males in each education group. However, while the coe¢ cients are not
statistically signicant, the coe¢ cients on NewJobi;t 4 are smallest (and neg-
ative for males) for those with at least a bachelors degree (Appendix Table
A2).
Table 4 shows no evidence of adverse selection based on ten-year wage
growth. Wages of workers who moved 10 years ago are approximately 3.5 to
4.5%, or roughly 0.4% per year, higher than wages of workers who did not
change jobs ten years ago, depending on whether we control for the 11th lag
of wage. Similar to the four-year results, the e¤ects appear smaller among
males, although here they are also smaller among blue-collar workers and the
di¤erences fall short of signicance at conventional levels (for both groups
e¤ects are still positive and statistically signicant). There is no statistically
signicant di¤erential e¤ect among workers with higher wages in t 10. Results
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Matching
NewJobt-10 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.035** 0.038** 0.054** 0.111** 0.027***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.021] [0.053] [.010]
NewJobt-10*Ln(Waget-10) -0.027
[0.022]
Observations 18,167 18,167 14,065 14,065 8,266 6,296 3,517 14,065 18,167
R-squared 0.526 0.532 0.569 0.572 0.562 0.450 0.379 0.573
Subgroup All All All All Male Blue Collart-11
Experiencet-10
≤25th 
percentile All All
Include Demographics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-11) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4: Relation between Job Mobility and Ten-Year Wage Growth
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  Observations weighted 
by the sampling weights of the survey. Each regression includes year fixed effects, and a quartic in weeksexperiencet-10, Ln(Wage)t-
10,  and TotalJobst-11.  Regressions including the 11th lag of wage also include a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-11.  Column (7) restricts the 
sample to individuals with weeks experience ≤  the 25th percentile of the distribution (251 weeks, or approximately 5 years). In the 
final column, observations who were in a new job last period are matched to observations not in a new job last period, based on 
weeks experiencet-10, waget-10, total jobst-11, and survey year. Exact matching was specified for survey year. The procedure uses the 
bias adjustment in Abadie and Imbens (2011). See text for details of sample construction, regression specifications, and matching 
procedure.
from the matching estimation are similar to the principal results (column 9).23
The interactions between NewJobi;t 10 and TotalJobsi;t 11 are not statis-
tically signicant, though the magnitudes suggest positive e¤ects across the
distribution of total number of jobs (Appendix Table A4). There is also not
any evidence of adverse selection among any of the education groups, or for
the males in any of the education groups. The coe¢ cients on NewJobi;t 10
are large, positive, and statistically signicant for those with a high school
diploma and those with at least a bachelors degree. The coe¢ cients are much
closer to zero and not statistically signicant for those with less than a high
school diploma and those with some college (Appendix Table A3).
5 Conclusion
We have shown that, in a broad class of models of adverse selection in the labor
market, following a move workers should experience slower wage growth than
otherwise observationally identical workers who do not change employers. We
23When we match on the 11th lag of wage as well, the e¤ect is very similar to the regression
estimate.
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have also shown that there is little or no empirical support for this prediction,
suggesting either that this form of adverse selection is less important in the
labor market than other factors generating mobility or that a key auxiliary
assumption is false.
The most plausible candidate among the auxiliary assumptions is that the
raiding market is competitive. This, along with the assumption that rms
earn quasi-rents on their private information, generates the prediction that
newly hired workers are, on average, overpaid. It is di¢ cult to make strong
claims about the e¤ects of adverse selection in a market with, for example, on-
the-job search. This might depend on the bargaining model, search technology
and/or other details of the model. At the same time, the tautology that adverse
selection means that mobility is a bad signal suggests that the prediction may
be quite robust.
We are therefore inclined to the conclusion that adverse selection is not
a major driving force behind job turnover. Instead turnover is likely to be
driven by improvements in match quality as workers move jobs or by the
natural progression of careers.
Our prediction is a test for adverse selection in the labor market, and we
nd little empirical support for the prediction and thus for adverse selection.
However, we note that this prediction is generated by two assumptions that are
applicable to a wide range of competitive models, raiding rms make expected
prot of zero and incumbents earn quasi-rents, and one which applies less
generally but is still applicable in many other models, future productivity
growth is independent of mobility.
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Theory Appendix
Bertrand competition between informed employers
Suppose there are two types, a fraction g of type h and a fraction 1  g of
type l with productivity vl < vh. If a worker leaves the incumbent rm and
joins another rm, his productivity is known to both rms who subsequently
Bertrand compete and thus pay vi. In case of a tie between the value of the
best outside o¤er and the countero¤er, h   type workers (except for random
movers) remain with the incumbent rm. In equilibrium, all raiding rms will
make the same o¤er. We assume that workers randomize among raiding rms.
Therefore, for simplicity of exposition we will often refer to the set of raiding
rms as the outside or raiding rm.
We use qt to denote the wage received in period t by a worker who quits in
that period and st to denote the wage received by an h  type who stays with
her incumbent rm and has not previously quit.
Proposition 3 The incumbent rm o¤ers a wage of vl to all l type workers.
Proof. If it o¤ered a wage greater than vl and some l  type workers remained
with the rm, it could increase prot by lowering the wage. If no l   type
workers remain with the rm in this case, we normalize the (meaningless)
wage countero¤er to vl. Suppose that the countero¤er were less than vl. If
l  type workers are indi¤erent between quitting endogenously and remaining
with the incumbent, the incumbent could increase prot by raising its wage
innitesimally. If l   type workers strictly prefer to quit endogenously, it is
costless to the incumbent to raise its wage to the lesser of vl or a wage that
makes the workers indi¤erent between staying and quitting. In the latter case,
the previous argument applies. In the former, we normalize the countero¤er to
vl. If no l  type worker quit endogenously, then raiders would o¤er the mean
productivity in all periods. But in this case, l   type workers would all prefer
to quit immediately.
Lemma 1 No h  type quits endogenously.
1
Proof. If st < vh, the incumbent can increase prot by raising its o¤er to
any st < vh which retains h   type workers. If st = vh is required to retain
h  types, we assume that the incumbent makes this countero¤er.
Lemma 2 If there is a last period in which an l   type quits endogenously,
all l   types must quit in that period.
Proof. Let t be the last such period. Then qt+1 = qt 8t > t. But then
l   types will strictly prefer to quit in period t + 1 than in any subsequent
period.
Proposition 4 All l   type workers quit in nite time.
Proof. If there is only one period in which l workers quit endogenously,
then by the previous lemma, all workers quit that period. If l workers quit
endogenously in multiple periods but there is no last period in which they quit,
then we must have
vl +
qt0
(1 + r)t
0 t = qt +
vl
1 + r
(1)
since both quitters and stayers earn vl in every period except t and t0. But for
t0 su¢ ciently large, this implies qt0 > vh, a contradiction.
Proposition 5 The path of raiding o¤ers is given by
qt+1 = qt (1 + r)  rvl if qt (1 + r)  rvl < vh
qt = vh; otherwise: (2)
Proof. Set t0 = t+ 1 in (1) and rearrange terms.
Proposition 6 The countero¤ers to h  types, are given by
st =
vh + vlr
1 + r
; if t < T
sT = qT (3)
st = vh; if t > T:
2
Proof. We require that h  types be just indi¤erent between quitting endoge-
nously in periods t and t+ 1 so that (using the fact that all subsequent wages
do not depend on the choice between these two strategies)
qt +
vh
1 + r
= st +
qt+1
1 + r
: (4)
Combining (4) with the expression for qt gives (3)
Lemma 3 There is exactly one period in which vh > qt  (vh + vlr) = (1 + r) .
Proof. Replace qt with (vh + vlr) = (1 + r) in (1) to get qt+1 = vh.
Finally, let pt be the proportion of all l   type workers who quit, endoge-
nously or exogenously in period t. We require that
1t=1pt = 1: (5)
Lemma 4 Equation (5) has a solution.
Proof. Using the fact that a fraction d quits randomly each period, we have
that the fraction of h   types quitting each period is d (1  d)t 1 . Therefore
for raiding rms to make zero prot, we require that
qt =
ptvl + d (1  d)t 1 vh
pt + d (1  d)t 1
: (6)
Moreover, by consecutive substitution, we have
qt = q1 (1 + r)
t 1   vl
 
(1 + r)t 1   1 : (7)
Combining (6) and (7) gives
pt = d (1  d)t 1
vh   q1 (1 + r)t 1 + vl
 
(1 + r)t 1   1 
(1 + r)t 1

(q1   vl)
(8)
which is decreasing and continuous in q1.
3
Next we need to show that pt is continuous. This follows immediately if
the number of periods in which l   types quit is constant. Therefore consider
a q1 such that l   types are just indi¤erent between quitting in period T and
T + 1 when they would receive qT+1 = vh. Since no l   type actually quits in
period T + 1, if we increase q0, there are still T periods in which l   types
quit. So we have continuity in that direction. If we reduce, q0, the number of
l  types quitting in the rst T periods increases continuously and the number
quitting in the T + 1 period increases continuously from 0: Therefore pt is
continuous in q1.
Finally let q1 # vl. Then pt !1. While if q1 = vh
pt = d (1  d)t 1 1  (1 + r)
t 1
(1 + r)t 1
(9)
which equals d if t = 1 and is negative for t > 1 which ensures that pt < 1.
Combining the various lemmas and propositions gives the principal result:
Theorem 1 There exists a unique equilibrium in which raiding o¤ers are
given by (2), the incumbent countero¤ers to l  types with vl and to h  types
according to (3) and in which all l   types quit in nite time.
To see that this example satises our general claim about the wages of
stayers and quitters, note that quitters, on average, receive their expected
VMP in both the period in which they quit and in the next period. Stayers
are, on average, paid less than their VMP and thus, on average, receive a
wage increase in the period that they quit. In addition, h   types receive
wage increase if they stay in the period in which the wage jumps to vh and,
except in a knife-edge case in the preceding period.
4
Data Appendix
Blue- and White-Collar Workers
Up until 2000, the 1970 Census occupation codes are used, and we dene
the following as white collar: managers, o¢ cials, and proprietors; professional,
technical, and kindred; clerical and kindred; sales workers. The following are
dened as blue collar: craftsmen, foremen, and kindred; operatives and kin-
dred; laborers, except farm; service workers, except private household. Start-
ing in 2002, the 2000 Census occupation codes are used. The following codes
are dened as white collar: management; business and nancial operations;
computer and mathematical; architecture and engineering; legal; education,
training, and library; arts, design, entertainment, sports, media (except equip-
ment workers); healthcare practitioners and technical; sales and related; o¢ ce
and administrative support; life, physical, and social sciences; community and
social services. The following are dened as blue collar: healthcare support;
protective service; food preparation and serving related; building and grounds
cleaning and maintenance; personal care and service; construction and extrac-
tion; installation, repair, and maintenance; production; transportation and
material moving; arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media (only equip-
ment workers).
Matching Results
Of the 50,855 observations in the specications analyzing one-year wage growth,
51% are never used as a match for another observation, and 36% are used more
than zero times, but less than or equal to three times (weighted by the number
of other observations used to match the same individual). All but three of the
observations are matched to another observation in the exact survey year.
Of the 35,958 observations in the specications analyzing four-year wage
growth, 50% are never used as a match for another observation, and 36% are
used one to three times (weighted by the number of other observations used
to match the same individual). All but one of the observations is matched to
5
another observation in the exact survey year.
Of the 18,167 observations in the specications analyzing ten-year wage
growth, 50% are never used as a match for another observation, and 35% are
used one to three times (weighted by the number of other observations used to
match the same individual). All of the observations were matched to another
observation in the exact survey year.
6
NewJobt-1 0.003 -0.002 0.018*** 0.019** 0.013 0.014 -0.001 -0.0001
[0.012] [0.014] [0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.014] [0.009] [0.013]
Observations 4,075 2,966 18,392 10,569 8,639 4,000 9,403 5,267
R-squared 0.591 0.565 0.700 0.677 0.695 0.671 0.750 0.745
Subgroup All Males All Males All Males All Males
Include Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table A1: Relationship between Job Mobility and One-Year Wage Growth, by Education
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  
Observations weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. Each regression includes year fixed effects, and a quartic 
in weeksexperiencet-1, Ln(Wage)t-1, TotalJobst-2, and a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-2.  See text for details of sample 
construction and regression specifications.
No High School High School Some College At Least Bachelor's
NewJobt-4 0.026 0.017 0.017* 0.018 0.023 0.013 0.004 -0.003
[0.019] [0.024] [0.009] [0.012] [0.015] [0.024] [0.013] [0.018]
Observations 2,619 1,948 13,067 7,740 6,173 2,910 6,513 3,775
R-squared 0.454 0.400 0.579 0.551 0.606 0.551 0.663 0.658
Subgroup All Males All Males All Males All Males
Include Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table A2: Relationship between Job Mobility and Four-Year Wage Growth, by Education
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  
Observations weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. Each regression includes year fixed effects, and a quartic 
in weeksexperiencet-4, Ln(Wage)t-4, TotalJobst-5, and a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-5.  See text for details of sample 
construction and regression specifications.
No High School High School Some College At Least Bachelor's
NewJobt-10 0.018 0.002 0.044*** 0.048** 0.017 0.008 0.048** 0.035
[0.030] [0.033] [0.015] [0.019] [0.020] [0.026] [0.021] [0.028]
Observations 1,017 765 6,526 3,960 3,159 1,533 3,362 2,007
R-squared 0.389 0.339 0.400 0.383 0.487 0.421 0.541 0.491
Subgroup All Males All Males All Males All Males
Include Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table A3: Relationship between Job Mobility and Ten-Year Wage Growth, by Education
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  
Observations weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. Each regression includes year fixed effects, and a quartic 
in weeksexperiencet-10, Ln(Wage)t-10, TotalJobst-11, and a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-11.  See text for details of sample 
construction and regression specifications.
No High School High School Some College At Least Bachelor's
Appendix Table A4: Relationship between Job Mobility and Wage Growth, by Number of Prior Jobs
One Year Four Year Ten Year
(1) NewJobt-t' 0.074*** 0.081** 0.062
[0.024] [0.036] [0.060]
(2) NewJobt-t'*TotalJobst-t'-1 -0.020** -0.016 0.002
[0.010] [0.015] [0.027]
(3) NewJobt-t'*(TotalJobst-t'-1)
2 0.002 0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.002] [0.004]
(4) NewJobt-t'*(TotalJobst-t'-1)
3 -2.90E-07 -0.00004 0.00004
[2.84e-7] [0.00009] [0.0002]
(5) NewJobt-t'*(TotalJobst-t'-1)
4 9.79E-10 5.02E-07 -2.54E-07
[9.2e-10] [1.35e-6] [3.29e-6]
Test (2) through (5) 0.043 0.062 0.532
Test (1) through (5) 0.005 0.007 0.001
Observations 40,514 28,376 14,065
R-squared 0.772 0.693 0.573
Include Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-t'-1) Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in 
brackets.  Observations weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. Each regression 
includes year fixed effects, and a quartic in weeksexperiencet-t', Ln(Wage)t-t', Ln(Wage)t-t'-1, and 
TotalJobst-t'-1.  See text for details of sample construction and regression specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NewJobt-1 0.002 0.000 0.011** 0.010** 0.009 0.011* 0.015* 0.023
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.026]
NewJobt-1*Ln(Waget-1) -0.005
[0.010]
Observations 50,859 50,859 40,516 40,516 22,805 18,222 10,129 40,516
R-squared 0.742 0.743 0.771 0.772 0.766 0.697 0.648 0.772
Subgroup All All All All Male Blue Collart-2
Experiencet-1
≤25th 
percentile All
Include Demographics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-2) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table A5: Relationship between Job Mobility and One-Year Wage Growth, Using Total Moves Definition of 
Mobility
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  
Observations weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. These specifications include the alternative measure of 
mobility in period t , constructed by adding the number of times newjob  is equal to one up through t.  See text for 
details.  Each regression includes year fixed effects, and a quartic in weeksexperiencet-1, Ln(Wage)t-1,  and TotalMovest-
2.  Regressions including the second lag of wage also include a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-2.  Column (7) restricts the sample 
to individuals with weeks experience ≤  the 25th percentile of the distribution (269 weeks, or approximately 5 years). 
See text for details of sample construction and regression specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NewJobt-4 0.015*** 0.013** 0.017*** 0.016** 0.010 0.018* 0.019 0.050
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.034]
NewJobt-4*Ln(Waget-4) -0.014
[0.014]
Observations 35,960 35,960 28,376 28,376 16,374 12,960 7,095 28,376
R-squared 0.652 0.654 0.691 0.693 0.683 0.587 0.504 0.693
Subgroup All All All All Male Blue Collart-5
Experiencet-4
≤25th 
percentile All
Include Demographics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-5) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  Observations 
weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. These specifications include the alternative measure of mobility in period t , 
constructed by adding the number of times newjob  is equal to one up through t . See text for details. Each regression 
includes year fixed effects, and a quartic in weeksexperiencet-4, Ln(Wage)t-4,  and TotalMovest-5.  Regressions including the 
fifth lag of wage also include a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-5.  Column (7) restricts the sample to individuals with weeks experience 
≤  the 25th percentile of the distribution (258 weeks, or approximately 5 years). See text for details of sample construction 
and regression specifications.
Appendix Table A6: Relationship between Job Mobility and Four-Year Wage Growth, Using Total Moves Definition of 
Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NewJobt-10 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.034** 0.035** 0.056*** 0.120**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] [0.015] [0.021] [0.054]
NewJobt-10*Ln(Waget-10) -0.030
[0.022]
Observations 18,169 18,169 14,065 14,065 8,266 6,296 3,517 14,065
R-squared 0.525 0.531 0.569 0.572 0.561 0.451 0.379 0.572
Subgroup All All All All Male Blue Collart-11
Experiencet-10
≤25th 
percentile All
Include Demographics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include Ln(Waget-11) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table A7: Relationship between Job Mobility and Ten-Year Wage Growth, Using Total Moves Definition of 
Mobility
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets.  Observations 
weighted by the sampling weights of the survey. These specifications include the alternative measure of mobility in period t , 
constructed by adding the number of times newjob is equal to one up through t . See text for details. Each regression 
includes year fixed effects, and a quartic in weeksexperiencet-10, Ln(Wage)t-10,  and TotalMovest-11.  Regressions including 
the 11th lag of wage also include a quartic in Ln(Wage)t-11.  Column (7) restricts the sample to individuals with weeks 
experience ≤  the 25th percentile of the distribution (251 weeks, or approximately 5 years). See text for details of sample 
construction and regression specifications.
